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EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law 
After Military Interventions. By Jane Stromseth, 
David Wippman, & Rosa Brooks. New York, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. Pp. x, 414. Index. $80, £45, cloth; 
$29.99, £17.99, paper. 
In this incisive and provocatively tided book-
Can Might Make Rights?-law professors Jane 
Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks 
examine the complex task of instituting the rule of 
law after military interventions. There are, of 
course, many types of military interventions-in-
cluding, for example, those undertaken unilater-
ally by one country or multilaterally by the inter-
national community, and those motivated by 
humanitarian or security concerns. Because glob-
alization tends to blur previously well-demarcated 
distinctions, the authors themselves acknowledge 
that "there can often be no neat distinction 
between 'humanitarian' concerns and 'security' 
concerns" (p. 3). Extreme poverty and injustice 
may lead to instability, wars, and terrorism-
which, in turn, may further fuel poverty and injus-
tice. As a result, military interventions will likely be 
fueled by a mix of actors with a mix of motivations. 
These actors and their varied motivations may 
have important consequences for conditions faced 
by intervenors in the wake of the intervention 
itself. As in the case of Iraq, unilateral interven-
tions motivated primarily by a country's own per-
ceived national security interests-especially 
when those interests are contested by other 
states-will likely be deemed by some other states 
as either illegal or illegitimate. To the authors' 
credit, however, Can Might Make Rights? provides 
an overarching framework in which to examine 
the interlocking issues arising out of a rule of law 
project following a military intervention, regard-
less of the initial conditions motivating the inter-
vention. Thus, as the authors note, "however dif-
ferent these various military interventions were on 
the front end, post-conflict issues in Afghanistan 
and Iraq had a great deal in common with post-
conflict issues in Kosovo, East Timor, or any of the 
other societies subject to international humanitar-
ian interventions before 9111" (p. 6). These post-
conflict commonalities can, indeed, be found in 
societies that would otherwise be radically differ-
ent. The authors aptly observe that "[a]lthough 
Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq are dramatically dif-
ferent societies, for instance, with divergent histo-
ries and cultures, they all had similar needs when 
the main phase of the fighting ended" (id.). 
The organization of the book reflects the 
authors' approach-to provide a comprehensive, 
integrated examination of the common issues and 
challenges most postconflict societies face. The 
book thus is not organized along specific regional 
lines, but rather along broader, more thematic 
lines that emphasize the necessary building blocks 
for rule oflaw efforts-"Blueprints for Post-Con-
flict Governance," "Security as Sine Qua Non," 
"The Challenge of Justice System Reform," 
"Accountability for Atrocities," "Creating Rule of 
Law Cultures," and "Enhancing Rule of Law 
Efforts." This approach allows the authors to 
highlight not just the historical and theoretical 
foundations of a rule oflaw endeavor, but also the 
pitfalls and difficulties faced by recent and current 
reconstruction efforts. The authors bring out the 
nuanced particularities of the situations they 
address, but in a way that does not overemphasize 
or exaggerate their uniqueness, thereby averting the 
hopeless conclusion that no broader lessons can be 
drawn from the specific situations discussed. 
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Because the authors have managed to cull sim-
ilarities drawn from so many diverse scenarios and 
have also provided the readers with an overarching 
set of principles around which to organize rule of 
law efforts, they have, in effect, written a curiously 
optimistic book, despite what may at first glance 
appear to be a generally gloomy assessment 
because of the many documented failures in past 
rule of law efforts. In addition, conceptual, nor-
mative, and theoretical issues characteristic of 
broad, abstract approaches to the rule of law are 
made concrete by the authors' concerted efforts to 
write a book that also benefits the practitioner. 
For example, they have drawn on an array of 
detailed case studies of armed interventions in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, 
Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and 
they have broken down broad themes into emi-
nently digestable parts, including "blueprints" 
drawn up to identify what worked and what did 
not. This emphasis on the concrete is, indeed, 
one of the reasons why the book projects such 
an optimistic tone. By focusing on how problems 
should be approached, why past efforts had 
failed, how to improve the likelihood of success, 
and such matters, the book not only aims to be 
of help to the practitioner, but suggests, in effect, 
that these problems, though entrenched, are not 
intractable. 
The book's central question, as the authors put 
it, is the following: "Concretely, how does one go 
about creating the rule oflaw?" (p. 5). The task is 
difficult and complex, especially because rule of 
law has become "a handy shorthand way to 
describe the extremely complex bundle of cultural 
commitments and institutional structures that 
support peace, human rights, democracy, and 
prosperity" (p. 4). But the task is also a necessary 
one because, as the authors put it, "military inter-
ventions that do not ultimately rebuild the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies are doomed to under-
mine their own goals. This is true whether the 
interventions were undertaken initially for hu-
manitarian reasons, securiry reasons, or a compli-
cated mix of the two" (p. 7). 
Drawing from their own understanding of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the rule of law, as 
well as from concrete lessons distilled from specific 
case studies, the authors emphasize one dominant, 
recurring theme-as simple and obvious as it is 
profound. First and foremost, intervenors need to 
realize from the outset that effectively building the 
rule of law is immensely complex and beset by 
internal contradictions. It thus requires a "holistic 
process" (p. 12) that is broadly based and takes 
into account, for example, that each sector of 
reform is inextricably linked to others. To consider 
just one case, if one attempts to build up state insti-
tutions, such as the police or the judiciary, without 
a concomitant effort to engage in governance 
reforms creating a system of checks and balances, 
the ultimate result may be to create a lopsided set 
of state institutions in which one branch is dom-
inant, willful, or oppressive, or that allows for the 
emergence of a political leader with the same char-
acteristics. When the United States launched 
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, 
the United States and the international commu-
nity separated the much feared military from the 
police and implemented police reform designed to 
create a professional, well-disciplined force. 
Although police reform was initially successful, 
the failure to institute comparable reform in other 
related sectors, such as the judiciary, ultimately 
undermined the positive record of police reform. 
Corrupt judges released suspects with political 
connections or financial resources, resulting 
quickly in the demoralization of the police force. 
Consequently, according to the authors, the 
process adopted must be "ends-based and strate-
gic, adaptive and dynamic, and systemic" (p. 13). 
Political choices must be constantly balanced, 
evaluated, and exercised in a holistic way. The 
authors call theirs a "synergistic" approach to post-
intervention rule oflaw. It requires intervenors to 
identify fundamental objectives behind a rule of 
law project and to adapt existing local resources 
and conditions toward these objectives. An adap-
tive orientation requires intervenors to focus on 
the desires and needs of ordinary people and to 
engage with grassroots demands. Of course, as I 
discuss later and as the authors undoubtedly rec-
ognize and warn about throughout their book, this 
objective is itself fraught with deeply rooted inter-
nal contradictions. 
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Nor surprisingly, because of their desire to write 
a book that will be helpful to on-the-ground prac-
titioners, the authors opted for a descriptive and 
pragmatic definition of the rule of law 
in which the state successfully monopolizes 
the means of violence, and in which most 
people, most of the time, choose to resolve 
disputes in a manner consistent with proce-
durally fair, neutral, and universally applica-
ble rules, and in a manner that respects fun-
damental human rights norms (such as 
prohibitions on racial, ethnic, religious and 
gender discrimination, torture, slavery, pro-
longed arbitrary detentions, and extrajudi-
cial killings). In the context of roday's glo-
bally interconnected world, this requires 
modern and effective legal institutions and 
codes, and it also requires a widely shared cul-
tural and political commitment to the values 
underlying these institutions and codes. (P. 78) 
This definition can be parsed and analyzed in 
many ways. Bur for the purposes of this review, 
there are at least two crucial points that are served 
by, and embedded in, this definition: first, the rule 
of law is inextricable from culture, and second, 
security is viral to the rule of law. 
I will start with the culture question. Rarely 
have rule of law projects taken culture into 
account. In fact, most commentators wish to side-
step what is generally deemed a thorny and all-roo-
controversial subject. Can Might Make Rights? is 
thus one of those rare gems that rake on this del-
icate subject. Indeed, the authors confront the 
issue head-on, declaring that "the rule of law is a 
matter of cultural commitments as well as institu-
tions and legal codes" (p. 78). Throughout the 
book, culture is granted a prominent stage-
which is not surprising, of course, given the 
authors' preference for a synergistic approach. 
Such an approach, once recognized as crucial and 
adopted as vital, necessitates the view espoused by 
the authors that "[w]ithout a widely shared cul-
tural commitment to the idea of the rule of law, 
courts are just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats, 
and constitutions are just pieces of paper" (p. 76). 
Given that the authors have defined the rule of 
law to include a relatively thick substantive com-
ponent-adherence to fundamental human rights 
norms-it is obvious that a society's nonadher-
ence to such fundamental human rights norms on 
cultural grounds will present intervenors with a 
cultural quandary and more. Intervenors, who are 
typically outsiders, will have to confront the diffi-
cult choices between promoting international 
human rights and respecting local mores and gar-
nering domestic support and legitimacy. This pro-
cess will, without doubt, require intervenors to 
strike a balance that enables them to achieve a set 
of locally acceptable arrangements that also meet 
international human rights standards. 
On the one hand, the authors warn that new 
laws, even nominally better ones that satisfy 
human rights norms, cannot simply be imposed 
from "on high" (p. 195) without creating local 
antagonism. Institutions and rules cannot be 
imported wholesale but must be constructed on a 
preexisting cultural base. On the other hand, the 
authors recognize the need, under certain circum-
stances, to confront the culture issue directly. In 
their discussion of Liberia, for example, they note 
that reforms cannot take root "without a funda-
mental transformation of Liberian political insti-
tutions and culture" (p. 10 1) and that "domestic 
legitimacy is not the only touchstone for law 
reform in post -conflict societies" (p. 197). Indeed. 
Bur what if the indigenous cultural base is vio-
lative of international human rights norms? As the 
authors note, in Kosovo the authorities adminis-
tering Kosovo under UN auspices vacillated 
between various options. First, they opted to keep 
local law, the law in existence before NATO inter-
vention, as the applicable law. This decision alien-
ated Kosovars, who refused to be ruled by "Serb 
law." The authorities resolved the crisis by declar-
ing that the law applicable in Kosovo would be the 
law in force before Serbian termination of Koso-
vo's autonomy-in effect, "Kosovo law," even 
though, ironically, it was far less consistent with 
international human rights norms than "Serb 
law." Recognizing the need to uphold interna-
tional human rights law, the international author-
ities also decreed that whatever law was applied 
had to be consistent with international human 
rights standards. 
These conflicting decrees themselves highlight 
the clashing imperatives that intervenors face 
'when confronted with the question of whether to 
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promote self-determination or human rights. One 
option is to look for a balance that will not alienate 
local actors even as the human rights dimensions 
of the rule oflaw are being pursued incrementally. 
Another option is to engage outright in a funda-
mental transforming of local culture, instilling 
new values and norms in order to bring local cul-
ture into alignment with minimum human rights 
standards. The authors state emphatically that 
building the rule of law involves "both a practical 
project of institution-building and a cultural 
project of shaping attitudes and commitments" 
(p. 178). At some point, then, intervenors may 
have to bite the bullet and confront the dilemma 
directly. What should intervenors do when cus-
tomary practices and the traditional authority fig-
ures discriminate against certain vulnerable seg-
ments of the population? Of course, the "law" 
component of"rule oflaw" must be called upon; 
intervenors will draft the necessary laws, construct 
the necessary institutions, and provide the requi-
site institutional tools necessary for broad reform. 
Yet history and experience have shown that such 
measures are not sufficient. "Changing attitudes 
and expectations" is also necessary and "may be the 
hardest challenge of all" (p. 246). 
New norms would have to be inculcated. If the 
effort succeeds, a "tipping point" will be ulti-
mately be reached, and the new norms will "cas-
cade" through a society until they enjoy relatively 
broad support. Yet how does one go about doing 
this? With much insight and clarity, and in a way 
that is both simple and profound, the authors pro-
vide examples of how new norms might be 
instilled and propagated. Take, for example, their 
assessment that two fields of law-"transitional 
justice" and "rule oflaw reform," which have been 
long segregated and divided into two relatively 
separate areas of study-should best be studied in 
conjunction with one another. Transitional jus-
tice usually focuses on accountability, whereas rule 
of law reform, the authors convincingly demon-
strate, needs to focus on the inculcation of new 
norms. Nevertheless, why not use the criminal tri-
als of perpetrators of atrocities as a vehicle in post-
conflict societies for instilling in a systematic way 
the norms of accountability and transparency? 
This suggestion is, of course, itself an example of 
the very "holistic" process that they advocate. As 
the authors so aptly put it, the closing of this divide 
would mean that "opportunities for valuable syn-
ergies between accountability efforts and rule of 
law reform programs can be pursued more effec-
tively" (p. 253). The authors then identify three 
factors that would maximize the chances that 
international accountability proceedings would 
have a positive impact on the norm-creating com-
ponent of rule oflaw: (1) whether key perpetrators 
are effectivelydisempowered, (2) whether the pro-
ceedings themselves demonstrate a rejection of 
past abuses and an embracing of fairness, and (3) 
whether the accountability proceedings will con-
tribute to the building of domestic capacity for 
instituting the rule of law (for example, through 
outreach efforts between the international crimi-
nal law sector and its domestic counterpart). 
In other words, like so much that is incisive 
about the book, the authors have backed up their 
normative and theoretical framework with con-
crete, practical suggestions. If the "rule oflaw is as 
much a culture as a set of institutions, as much a 
matter of the habits, commitments, and beliefs of 
ordinary people as oflegal codes" (p. 310), then 
how might it be created? The authors offer some 
suggestions. Although lawyers are the ones who 
are most likely to be involved in rule of law 
projects, they need to think not just about legal 
codes and institutions, but also about cultural 
transformation, and hence about turning to non-
legal institutions, such as the media, civil society, 
and popular culture. The authors urge intervenors 
to fund "standard" nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) that monitor the justice system and 
disseminate information to the public, as well as 
less conventional, non-law-oriented NGOs, such 
as those that focus on the status of women as 
reflected in education and health care. 
The authors' focus on women, in particular, is 
well placed. Indeed, issues related to women's edu-
cation and health care have been shown to have a 
ripple effect on women's legal rights. As I've dis-
cussed elsewhere, 1 the Grameen Bank, which spe-
cializes in microcredit, engages in more than just 
lending. It has also adopted a social-development 
1 Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA.]. INT'L L. 357, 
410-11 (2007). 
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agenda called the "Sixteen Decisions" as part of its 
objective to transform the social consciousness of 
its borrowers. At weekly meetings, borrowers thus 
agree to advance principles that have health, edu-
cation, and social components. Some of these 
principles address basic sanitation issues, such as 
the need to build and use pit latrines. Some address 
education by asking borrowers to practice a "defer-
ral of selfish gratification by saving and educating 
children." Others deal with social attitudes and 
beliefs, such as asking borrowers not to take dowry 
at their sons' weddings, not to give dowry at those 
of their daughters, and not to practice child mar-
nage. 
The effort to eradicate female genital mutila-
tion is another example of moving beyond the law 
alone to achieve social change. In particular, coun-
tries that have ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women2 (CEDA W) are obligated by the 
terms of the treaty to "to promote equality by 
breaking down commonly held stereotypes 
impacting culture and tradition.''3 Article 5(a), in 
particular, requires states parties to "take all appro-
priate action" necessary "to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of preju-
dices and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the supe-
riority of either of the sexes or on stereoryped roles 
for men and women." To consider one relevant 
example, Egypt's effort to eliminate the genital 
mutilation of girls had been ineffective by legisla-
tion alone. But then, with a view to changing this 
cultural practice, one of the nation's largest NGOs 
pursued an education campaign aimed at women, 
religious leaders, and unmarried men that por-
trayed the issue as one of family planning and 
health care, thus changing the meaning of female 
genital mutilation. This Egyptian campaign, 
funded by the United States and United Nations, 
has achieved a 75 percent eradication rate even in 
2 Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13. 
3 Cao, supra note 1, at 404; see Abby Morrow Rich-
ardson, Women s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need 
to Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19. 
Egypt's more remote villages, and the same expe-
rience has been replicated in Senegal.4 
The authors have thus clearly zeroed in on one 
of the most glaring gaps in rule of law work. As 
they succinctly put it, intervenors need to move 
"beyond elites and legal institutions and focus on 
the long-term project of building deep cultural 
commitments to the rule of law" (p. 346). Their 
suggestions run wide and deep-investing in civil 
society, legal education, general outreach pro-
grams that include women, and so on-much 
beyond conventional projects that have focused 
primarily on formal institutions and legislation. 
As I noted at the beginning of the review, 
among the many significant points emphasized by 
the authors is that security is, without doubt, the 
sine qua non; the authors observe that "extreme 
insecurity (insurrection, civil war, frequent terror-
ist attacks) makes it virtually impossible for soci-
eties to sustain the rule oflaw" (p. 78). By the same 
token, "[a]bsent basic security, efforts to reform 
political institutions, adopt new laws, promote 
national reconciliation, and jump-start economic 
growth are destined to fail" (p. 134). Yet as the 
authors also point out, their case studies show that 
military victory is elusive and ambiguous, and 
even in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, victory 
over Saddam Hussein and the Taliban was simply 
a first stage followed by an arduous and compli-
cated second stage of bringing under control the 
unending, hit-and-run counterinsurgencies. 
That is to say, security may well remain an unre-
solved issue even as rule of law efforts continue. 
Additionally, other, outside states sometimes 
intrude into failed states or into those that have not 
completed their state-building process. In the 
absence of an effective government, such stares are 
also susceptible to exploitation by warlords, pri-
vate militias, bandits, criminals, terrorists, and 
other spoilers. Needless to say, building a rule of 
law under those conditions is a daunting chal-
lenge. The same process that took Europe centu-
ries to complete is collapsed by international actors 
into a span of only a few years. 
Imagine implementing the disarmament and 
demobilization ofbelligerents in an atmosphere of 
4 Cao, supra note I, at 405-06. 
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chaos and insecurity, and at the same time setting 
in motion the conditions necessary to restart the 
economy and stabilize the sociopolitical structure 
so the former belligerents can be meaningfully 
reintegrated. Indeed, not just security-though 
security is absolutely vital as a necessary precondi-
tion for rule oflaw reforms that follow- but cul-
tural transformation and everything else advo-
cated by a holistic, or synergistic, approach will 
require a long-term commitment by intervenors. 
Yet this long-term commitment, whether military 
or financial, is unfortunately- but predictably-
unlikely. Indeed, intervenors' unwillingness to 
enter into sustained, costly endeavors is generally 
foreseeable. As the authors note, intervenors are 
often caught in a catch-22. For example, American 
reluctance to use deadly force against looters in the 
immediate postintervention period served to fuel 
the violence of remnants of the Iraqi army, not to 
mention terrorists and other militants. "Spoilers 
who conclude that interveners lack the political 
will to confront them will invariably take advan-
tage" (p. 158), "especially if the intervenors cannot 
be counted on for protection" (p. 147). And Iraqis 
who would have otherwise supported coalition 
forces in their reconstruction oflraq "had to hedge 
their bets for fear that the coalition either could 
not protect them or might abandon the whole 
reconstruction project" (p. 146). It is not difficult 
for the local population to discern that "spoilers 
are there for the long haul" (p. 156) or for the bel-
ligerents to discern that interveners may be "timid 
or incapable of imposing their will" (p. 146). 
Yet one needs to ask, what does it mean-in 
efforts to achieve the rule of law-to "use coer-
cion" (p. 147) and to impose one' swill? House-to-
house searches? Air strikes? Other draconian mea-
sures? The authors rightly observe that the mission 
in Afghanistan is endangered "partly because of 
the reluctance of the interveners, principally the 
United States, to confront the warlords and mili-
tary commanders who run much of the country" 
(p. 160). But what would confrontation email and 
require? Throughout the book, the authors urge 
intervenors to act decisively. "When spoilers 
threaten to derail the peace process through vio-
lence, interveners cannot remain neutral. Instead, 
early and vigorous opposition to spoilers may prove 
essential to building a lasting peace" (p. 136). 
But the requisite military actions by interve-
nors-which might inevitably result in civilian 
injuries and deaths-may well create political 
problems and generate new opposition, both 
locally and internationally, and even pose poten-
tiallegal problems (are the efforts required to sta-
bilize the country disproportionate?). As a conse-
quence, political realities on the ground and 
opposition by domestic constituents in the inter-
venors' home states may make a holistic approach 
to the rule oflaw and postintervemion reconstruc-
tion difficult to accomplish. In addition, if spoilers 
are able to flourish and continue their attacks, the 
government's ability to maintain order and secu-
rity will diminish, starting a vicious spiral of dete-
riorating security and respect for the rule of law. 
And unless the situation can be stabilized, the sit-
uation can easily, and quickly, come to be seen as 
unsalvageable. 
As the authors note, troops are often withdrawn 
prematurely in "inappropriately early exits" (p. 
105), even when, as in Haiti and East Timor, a 
continued presence would have been uncontro-
versial. The reality of these rule of law efforts, 
including the maintenance of security, is that 
intervenors generally have only a short time frame 
in which to complete their missions. The brevity is 
not necessarily due to a myopic understanding of 
what it takes to draft a constitution and otherwise 
move a society more generally toward achieving 
the rule of law. It is more likely due to the inter-
venors' recognition that their own constituents at 
home are unlikely to tolerate protracted, expen-
sive, and potentially brutal endeavors in faraway 
places. Intervenors are consequently under intense 
scrutiny and subject to immense "pressure to end 
the fighting ... and to minimize their own post-
conflict involvement" (p. 89). The authors remark 
that "it is often difficult for interveners to muster 
the political will to support aggressive measures 
against spoilers in the post-conflict intervention 
phase. . . . [P]olitical support and associated 
resources dwindle accordingly. Tolerance for 
casualties similarly declines ... " (p. 156). 
As a result, choices are made that are unlikely to 
satisfy the holistic, or synergistic, approach that 
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the authors favor. For example, the initial mission 
in Somalia was to establish a secure environment 
for a humanitarian mission-to distribute food to 
Somalia's population following the collapse of the 
government in the early 1990s. Yet even this lim-
ited mission could not be sustained in a situation 
that lacked viable institutions and was fraught 
with security risks posed by warring clans. Thus, 
what started out as a limited humanitarian inter-
vention needed to morph into something more 
wide-ranging because the distribution of food 
required security-and "sustainable security 
requires at least minimally functioning state insti-
tutions," which can likely be achieved only" as part 
of a larger post-conflict reconstruction and rule of 
law project" (p. 140). Additionally, the U.S.-led 
Somalia operation was so fearful of "mission 
creep" that it resisted expanding its mandate to 
include disarming local militias to increase overall 
security. The American operation-its scope, mis-
sion, and objective-was defined by the insistence 
on "an early exit," an insistence that became all the 
more vehement when nineteen U.S. soldiers died 
in March 1994. 
Throughout the book, the authors warn that an 
effective rule of law effort requires intervenors 
both "to make virtually open-ended commit-
ments of resources and people to post-interven-
tion societies" and to recognize that such an effort 
is "likely to be less than popular with domestic 
constituencies concerned about how their tax dol-
lars are spent" (p. 4). Nonetheless, the authors 
argue in favor of"moral and pragmatic consider-
ations," and caution intervenors against the temp-
tation "to cut and run after the initial military 
phase of an intervention ends" (p. 7). 
In one succinct phrase, the authors are able to 
capture the essence of what has impeded the effec-
tive development of postconflict rule oflaw: "Per-
haps the most common problem has been haste" 
(p. 95). The result: in order to demonstrate quick 
improvements to satisfy domestic constituents in 
their home countries, intervenors fall for "seem-
ingly attractive short-term options with disastrous 
long-term consequences" (p. 132). Even assuming 
that intervenors manage to avoid missteps, engage 
in the necessary advance planning and coordina-
tion, and devote the resources necessary to insti-
tute the rule of law, the process will inescapably 
remain complicated, difficult, and time-consum-
ing, and will be marked by inevitable cycles of 
advances and retreats, as well as by "inherent par-
adoxes and contradictions" (p. 391). In the end, 
intervenors' commitment to postintervention re-
construction will depend ultimately on '"whether 
assisting the affected country is seen as vital to the 
national interests of a major or regional power,' 
otherwise 'the resources and commitment neces-
sary for coercive strategies to succeed will not be 
forthcoming'" (p. 368, quoting Stephen Stedman). 
Whether or not the authors intended it to be so, 
many parts of Can Might Make Rights? should be 
aimed primarily at rich-country intervenors and 
their domestic constituents. That is, one of the 
book's few weaknesses is its failure to situate the 
time-frame problem identified above in the appro-
priate context-as inherently interconnected with 
domestic politics in intervenors' home countries. 
Other parts of the book, such as those that deal 
with culture change, are appropriately directed at 
those countries in which rule of law efforts are 
being undertaken. In any event, the book is a mag-
isterial achievement in both its theoretical and 
scholarly sweep, and in the concrete case studies 
that will undoubtedly provide invaluable guid-
ance to those doing rule of law work on the 
ground. 
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Fairness in the World Economy: US Perspectives on 
International Trade Relations. By Arnerico Bev-
iglia Zampetti. Northampton, MA; Chelten-
ham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006. Pp. ix, 220. 
Index. $95, £55. 
WTO supporters and antiglobalization activ-
ists do not agree on much. However, they emphat-
ically share the assessment that the international 
trading system is unfair. Recent years have wit-
nessed an unlikely combination of Nobel laure-
ates, globe-trotting rock stars, and third-world 
nongovernmental organizations decry the lack of 
